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GERALD L. BRUNS 
Poetic Communities 
And one day they taught Hesiod glorious song while he i 
was shepherding his lambs under holy Helicon, and this 
word first the goddesses said to me?the Muses of 
Olympus, daughters of Zeus who holds the aegis: 
"Shepherds of the wilderness, wretched things of 
shame, mere bellies, we know how to speak many false 
things as though they were true; but we know, when we 
will, to utter true things." 
So said the ready-voiced daughters of great Zeus, and 
they plucked and gave me a rod, a shoot of sturdy laurel, 
a marvellous thing, and breathed into me a divine voice to 
celebrate things that shall be and things that were afore 
time; and they bade me sing of the race of the blessed 
gods that are eternally, but ever to sing of themselves both 
first and last. But why all this about oak and stone? 
?Hesiod, Theogony, 26-33 
ecstasy. Scholarly tradition pictures Hesiod, like Homer before 
him, as a great pedagogue.1 The poet is in charge of a vast ency 
clopedia concerning gods and heroes (and also, in Hesiod's partic 
ular case, everyday life). But from Hesiod we also learn that poet 
ry itself is not a kind of learning but a species of ecstasy. No one 
studies to be a poet. No one asks to be such a thing. One is, for no 
reason, summoned out of one's house and exposed to a kind of 
transcendence. Exactly what kind of transcendence is not always 
clear. One can imagine preferring the life of the belly where peo 
ple who say they are hungry can usually be taken at their word. 
Like biblical prophecy, poetry is a condition of election and a mode 
of responsibility, as much a curse as a calling since one is now 
hostage to a "divine voice" (or perhaps we would now say: to "the 
voice itself"). In an essay on the poetic or prophetic voice, "the 
voice itself," Jean-Luc Nancy says: "Someone singing, during the 
song, is not a subject."2 Likewise Emmanuel Levinas: inspiration 
"does not leave any place of refuge, any chance to slip away...."3 In 
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ecstasy I am turned inside out, exposed to others, still myself per 
haps but no longer an "I," that is, no longer a spontaneous agent 
but only a "who" or a "me": a passive, responsive, obsessive reper 
cussion of the Muses. 
2 partage. In the Ion Plato gives the basic theory of poetry as a 
condition of fascination, that is, of being touched, gripped, or mag 
netized (hypnotized).4 Fascination is a reversal of subjectivity from 
cognition to obsession. Of the fascination of images, for example, 
Maurice Blanchot writes: 
"Seeing presupposes distance, decisive 
ness which separates, the power to stay out of contact and in con 
tact to avoid confusion. Seeing means that this separation has nev 
ertheless become an encounter. But what happens when what you 
see, although at a distance, seems to touch you with a gripping 
contact, when the manner of seeing is a kind of touch, when see 
ing is contact at a distance? What happens when what is seen 
imposes itself on the gaze, as if the gaze were seized, put in touch 
with appearance?"5 An image is different from a concept. Seeing is 
conceptual: it grasps the world, holds it up for scrutiny as if at 
arm's length; but in fascination distance (and therefore aesthetics) 
collapses and the eye suffers a seizure. It is transfixed or fixed in 
place by the image and can see nothing else. A visionary experi 
ence is always a condition of confusion in which the eye is 
absorbed or consumed by what is seen; hence the avid or the 
vacant stare, the stony, liquidated look. I am no longer myself but 
another. A true image is not a likeness but a Medusa-event in 
which I no longer know what I am looking at. Although still part 
of the world, I experience the world as a surface to be crossed 
rather than a place to be occupied. Ecstasy means that (starting 
with myself) I am outside of and uncontainable within any order 
of things, an exile or nomad. However, this does not mean no one 
shares my condition. On the contrary, Plato emphasizes the con 
tagion of poetry; its magnetism flows from one to another like the 
spell that forms delirious Dionysian communities (536A-D). 
Fascination is a condition of participation in which one is no 
longer separated but is caught up in an ecstatic movement, which 
is always a movement from one to another that produces a gath 
ering or string, that is, not a dialogue or conversation (which 
would be a philosophical community formed by friends stepping 
in off the street) but what Jean-Luc Nancy calls a partage, a shar 
ing or division of voices in which the divine voice or "voice itself" 
is multiplied by being passed from one singularity to another like 
rumor or panic (Nancy prefers the metaphor of the gift).6 There is 
no abiding or indwelling universal spirit?no communion of 
"poetry in general," as Nancy says?but only the singular "being- 3 
outside-oneself" that is received and handed on (think of the 
round of voices in traditional song?"the voice itself," Nancy says, 
"can become yours or mine" [BP237]). This ecstasy is what poetry 
communicates, not a vision or a revelation; the sharing of ecstasy 
rather than of mind or spirit, language or myth, is the essence of 
poetry and of the poetic community (PV66/SV236-37). Such a com 
munity can never be sedentary; it does not grow or develop into a 
unitary order. A poetic community has the structure of a series of 
singularities rather than a fusion of many into one.7 Hence the 
topos of poetry as discourse in flight?"panic" is Blanchot's word 
for it: 
"Flight now makes each thing rise up as though it were all 
things and the whole of things?not like a secure order in which 
one might take shelter, nor even like a hostile order against which 
one must struggle, but as the movement that steals and steals 
away. Thus flight not only reveals reality as being this whole (a 
totality without gap and without issue) that one must flee: flight 
is this very whole that steals away, and to which it draws us even 
while repelling us."8 Poetry opens a hole in being through which 
every totality drains away. So it is not merely that the poet is out 
side and uncontainable with any order of things; it is that poetry 
disrupts in advance (an-arche) the possibility of any such order. As 
Blanchot says, incompletion (d?s uvrement) is its principle?"a 
principle of insufficiency" (1C5/UC5). Ecstasy, says Nancy, "defines 
the impossibility, both ontological and gnoseological, of absolute 
immanence (or of the absolute, and therefore of immanence) and 
consequently the impossibility either of an individuality in the 
precise sense of the term, or of a pure collective totality."9 In place 
(or in advance) of the settlement, the village, the realm, the social 
contract, civil society, liberal democracy, the total or merely proce 
dural state, poetry opens up an ecstatic or anarchic community?a 
community that (Nancy says) "resists collectivity itself as much as 
it resists the individual" (CD177/1NC71). An ecstatic community 
assembles and disperses (as at games, festivals, and rallies) but is 
not meant to last. Incompleteness, as said, is its principle. Eric 
Havelock has shown that an ecstatic community is what Socrates 
saw in the Athens around him: a vast theater, a performance cul 
ture basically hypnotic and anarchic in its operations and results.10 
Whence denial of ecstasy became for Socrates the first principle of 
4 his "city of words," which is a totally integrated economic order 
administered by sealed-off punctual egos exercising rational con 
trol (our once and future philosophers). Recall that the starting 
point of his construction is the critique of mimesis in Book in 
(393A-398B), where mimesis is a mode of "being-outside-oneself 
" 
or impersonation rather than the category of representation that it 
becomes in Book x. The problem of poetry is not its logical weak 
ness but its power to project people outside of themselves. Poetry 
is a dispersal or dissemination of subjectivities in which no one is 
oneself and everyone is somebody else, as in theater. Here would 
be the place to recall Nietzsche's analysis, which neatly summa 
rizes Plato's poetics (and anticipates Georges Bataille's): 
"Dionysiac excitation is capable of communicating to a whole mul 
titude this artistic power to feel itself surrounded by, and at one 
with, a host of spirits. What happens in the dramatic chorus is the 
primary dramatic phenomenon: projecting oneself outside oneself 
and then acting as though one had really entered another body, 
another character.... It should be made clear that this phenomenon 
is not singular but epidemic: a whole crowd becomes rapt in this 
manner."11 Belonging to a crowd (the first principle of theater) is a 
condition of rapture. Possibly mystics levitate alone. The ecstasy of 
poetry, however, is a social experience. In The Unavowable Community 
Maurice Blanchot recalls that for Georges Bataille ecstasy "could 
not take place if it was limited to a single individual...: [it] accom 
plishes itself...when it is shared" [C134-35/UC17].) Walter 
Benjamin: "man can be in ecstatic contact with the cosmos only 
communally. It is the dangerous error of modern men to regard this 
experience as unimportant and avoidable, and to consign it to the 
individual as the poetic rapture of starry nights."12 And he quotes 
Baudelaire as follows: "The pleasure of being in a crowd is a mys 
terious expression of sensual joy in the multiplication of num 
ber.... Number is in all... Ecstasy is a number....Religious intoxi 
cation of great cities....' Ch. B., uvres, vol. 2, pp. 626-627 
('Fus?es'). Extract the root of the human being!"13 
poetry: a short history. Aristotle's Organon or rule of dis 
course gives us the purely logical form of Socrates' city. Here a 
place for poetry is found by reconceptualizing mimesis as mathesis or 
learning (1448^4, 2-6), and then by laying bare as its deep struc 
ture a form of consecutive reasoning called muthos or plot (i45oa.7, 
1-7). Poetry is now for spectators on whom it has a therapeutic or 5 
calming effect. Instead of fascination it produces or enhances an 
essentially philosophical subjectivity. Aristotle is thought to have 
invented the concept of the critical spectator whose experience of 
literature is essentially solitary and reflective. (As Gadamer has 
shown, the Platonic spectator is always ecstatic.)14 What is at least 
true is that a principle of disengagement has been introduced into 
the theory of poetic experience?a distancing factor (perhaps we 
can speak of this as the aestheticizing of the poetic).15 As a species 
of discourse, poetry will henceforward be largely a branch of rhet 
oric reducible to handbooks, that is, not so much a discipline in its 
own right as a technique of mediation in the service of other dis 
cursive fields (or, as Horace said, in the service of empire). Poetry 
is defined by not having any discursive field of its own ("the alle 
gory of the poets" derives from theology). One can remark in 
passing (1) on Longinus, who affirms the ecstatic tradition but is 
himself lost to the world until the Seventeenth Century; (2) on the 
genre of the lyric, with its lethal erotic and satiric traditions (the 
one drives people to perdition, the other to suicide; Rome in fact 
passed a law forbidding satire); (3) on the classical tradition of 
poetic exile (Ovid, Dante, Milton, Joyce); (4) on the myth of the 
unschooled poet like Wolfram von Eschenbach, who says: "I don't 
know a single letter of the alphabet" (Parzival, 11.115). But what 
characterizes poetry throughout most of its history is its 
confinement to institutions not of its own making. For example, in 
European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages Ernst Robert Curtius 
asks about "the mode of existence of the medieval poet." For 
Curtius "mode of existence" is a social rather than ontological cat 
egory. The question is: "Why did one write poetry? One was 
taught to in school. A great many medieval authors wrote poetry 
because one had to be able to do so in order to prove oneself a c/er 
icus and litteratus; in order to turn out compliments, epitaphs, peti 
tions, dedications, and thus gain favor with the powerful or corre 
spond with equals; as also for the sake of vile Mammon. The writ 
ing of poetry can be taught and learned; it is schoolwork and a 
school subject."16 The modern university's writers' workshop pre 
serves this tradition. Curtius notes that the concept of the poet's 
"divine frenzy" is preserved as a rhetorical topos. Pope memorial 
izes this topos in the Peri Bathous; or, The Art of Sinking in Poetry, a 
6 parody of Longinus aimed at a new poetic culture whose origins 
are internal to the development of print technology and the new 
autonomous social spaces that it opens up: with the rise of mod 
ern cities poetry becomes a discourse of the street (the tavern, the 
coffee house, the periodical) rather than of the court, the church, 
and the school. The invention of the concept of art (in which 
poetry can now reflect on itself as if in a space of its own) is made 
possible by these social changes, as when Friedrich Schlegel char 
acterizes the poet as "a sociable being": conversing about poetry 
with poets and lovers of poetry now becomes a condition of poet 
ry as such.17 But what counts as poetry as such? Beginning with the 
Jena Romantics (the Athen?um is arguably the first literary com 
munity of modernity and a prototype of the avant-garde group) 
this becomes an open question: as poetry ceases to be a genre dis 
tinction, poetic theories are now necessary in order to pick out a 
piece of language as poetic (see Friedrich Schlegel, Athen?um 
Fragments, nos. 116 & 238) .l8 So we get the onset of modernism as a 
culture of prefaces and manifestoes. The distinction between the 
ory and practice, or between poetry and poetics, ceases to be self 
evident, as does the distinction between fragment and work. The 
poet Charles Bernstein says: "I imagine poetry...as that which 
can't be contained by any set of formal qualities."19 It becomes 
what Maurice Blanchot calls 
"fragmentary writing"?writing that 
is "averse to masterpieces, and even withdraws from the idea of 
the work to the point of making the latter a form of worklessness 
[d?s uvrement]" (E1592/1C403).20 As if, twenty-five hundred years 
later, poetry were breaking out of the Organon.21 As Bernstein says: 
"I imagine poetry as an invasion of the poetic into other realms: 
overflowing the bounds of genres, spilling into talk, essays, poli 
tics, philosophy" (P151). The Athen?um group is where this break 
out or dissemination is first enacted as a program (the idea is, 
among other things, to make philosophy poetic and poetry philo 
sophical). In their account of the group Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy write: "the fragment is the romantic genre par excellence.... 
In fact, only a single ensemble, published with the one-word title, 
Fragments, corresponds entirely (or as much as possible) to the 
fragmentary ideal of romanticism, notably in that it has no partic 
ular object and in that it is anonymously composed of pieces by 
several different authors."22 Imagine poetry not so much as a work 
of the spirit as a group experiment (Fr. 125: "Perhaps there would 7 
be a birth of a whole new era of the sciences and arts if symphi 
losophy and sympoetry became so universal and heartfelt that it 
would no longer be anything extraordinary for several comple 
mentary minds to create communal works of art"). 
the college of sociology. In Paris in 1937 Georges Bataille, 
along with Roger Callois, Michel Leiris, and Pierre Klossowski, 
began organizing a series of bi-monthly lectures called The College 
of Sociology, whose purpose was to investigate the nature of such 
social structures as the army, religious orders, secret societies, 
brotherhoods, companies, salons, drinking, gaming, or sporting 
clubs, youth groups, even political parties (normally) on the 
fringe.23 Crucially, Bataille will later (in Le coupable 1944) add the 
community of lovers and the artists' community.24 These struc 
tures are, according Callois, ecstatic or "sacred" communities, 
where the sacred consists "in the outburst of violations of rules of 
life: a sacred that expends itself, that spends itself (the orgiastic 
sacred)" (CS152). The sacred is not a theological but a social con 
cept. Sacred communities are not part of the productive 
economies of modern capitalist states; or rather, whatever func 
tion or goal might be assigned to them in the bourgeois order of 
things, they are defined by what Bataille calls "nonproductive 
expenditures of energy [d?pense]."25 A nonproductive expenditure 
of energy is one in which there is no return on investment. It is a 
gratuitous expenditure, absolutely outside any economy of 
exchange- or use-value. It is predicated upon a principle of loss 
rather than on the accumulation of capital. It belongs, if anywhere, 
to the economy of the gift. In an essay on "The Notion of 
Expenditure" (1933) Bataille gives several examples of such free 
expenditures: jewelry, religious sacrifice, kinky sex, gambling, art. 
It is important to know that within the category of art he singles 
out poetry as the premier example of free expenditure: 
The term poetry, applied to the least degraded and least 
intellectualized forms of the expression of a state of loss, 
can be considered synonymous with expenditure; it in fact 
signifies, in the most precise way, creation by means of 
loss. Its meaning is therefore close to that of sacrifice. It is 
8 true that the word 
"poetry" can only be appropriately 
applied to an extremely rare residue of what it commonly 
signifies and that, without a preliminary reduction, the 
worst confusions could result; it is, however, impossible 
in a first, rapid exposition to speak of the infinitely vari 
able limits separating subsidiary formations from the 
residual element of poetry. It is easier to indicate that, for 
the rare human beings who have this element at their dis 
posal, poetic expenditure ceases to be symbolic in its con 
sequences; thus, to a certain extent, the function of repre 
sentation engages the very life of the one who assumes it. 
It condemns him to the most disappointing forms of activ 
ity, to misery, to despair, to the pursuit of inconsistent 
shadows that provide nothing but vertigo or rage. The 
poet frequently can use words only for his own loss; he is 
often forced to choose between the destiny of a reprobate, 
who is as profoundly separated from society as dejecta are 
from apparent life, and a renunciation whose price is a 
mediocre activity, subordinated to vulgar and superficial 
needs (PM30-31/VE120). 
The important line here is: "poetic expenditure ceases to be sym 
bolic in its consequences." This is the thesis of modern poetics.26 
Poems are made of words but are not a use of them. That is, the 
words of the poem are no longer forms of mediation; they have 
become events of communication in the special sense that 
Bataille attaches to this word. Communication is not a concept 
from information theory; it refers not to the transmission of mes 
sages but to the contagious relation in which states of existence 
are passed along from one subject to another (Nancy's partage). 
Communication has the structure of Plato's magnetic chain rather 
than the give-and-take anatomy of dialogue, commerce, and social 
struggle. In Bataille's words, communication is made of "conta 
gions of energy, of movement, of warmth, or transfers of elements, 
which constitute inevitably the life of your organized being. Life is 
never situated at a particular point: it passes rapidly from one 
point to another (or from multiple points to other points), like a 
current or a sort of streaming of electricity."27 At all events in poet 
ry words are no longer to be exchanged for meanings or things: 
they are now like images of fascination?moments of reversal that 9 
displace the logical or cognitive subject from its position of sover 
eignty and control. As Blanchot says apropos of Kafka: "The writer 
gives up saying T" (EL21/SL26). Poetry is heterogeneous with 
respect to an order of things organized from the perspective of the 
logical subject. So we should say that, at least from the poet's 
point of view, Plato got poetry right.28 
la boh?me. Notice that Bataille defines the poet's choice in 
terms of "the destiny of the reprobate" as against submission to 
the principle of necessity. Imagine this destiny as a condition that 
makes poetry possible. Students of Walter Benjamin tend to be 
guarded about the fact that he was among the occasional partici 
pants in Bataille's College of Sociology (Benjamin's saintliness 
seems out of place in this morally and politically dubious environ 
ment). In fact in the spring of 1939 Benjamin was scheduled to 
deliver a paper on "Some Motifs in Baudelaire," but his presenta 
tion was postponed until the Fall, and by then France was at war 
and within a few months Benjamin would be a refugee (fortunate 
ly he gave his manuscripts to Bataille, a librarian, for safekeeping). 
There were in any case no more meetings of Bataille's group. 
However, as we have it, the text of "Some Motifs in Baudelaire" is 
remarkably coherent with both the letter and spirit of inquiry 
around which Bataille had organized his College. Benjamin's 
theme is social ecstasy. In the first place there is the thesis that 
Baudelaire intended his poetry to produce a state of shock.29 
(Undoubtedly Baudelaire, not Rimbaud, was the first Surrealist.) 
But perhaps more important is the mode of social existence that 
Baudelaire represents for Benjamin, namely that of the homeless 
fl?neur whose environment is the street and the crowd, where "the 
man of the crowd" is restless, manic, obsessive, and unstable in 
his identities (GS.1.2.626-27/CB128). Benjamin says of Baudelaire: 
"the street...became a refuge for him" ("The Paris of the Second 
Empire in Baudelaire," GS.1.2.573/CB70). In the street one is 
always outside of oneself, and for Benjamin Baudelaire is nothing 
in himself but is the consummate role-player ("fl?neur, apache, 
dandy, and ragpicker were so many roles to him") 
(GS.1.2.600/CB97). And again: "On the physiognomy of 
Baudelaire as that of the mime: Courbet reports that he looked 
10 different every day" (GS.V.1.419/AP333). Moreover, Baudelaire's 
poetry is "nomadic" in Deleuze and Guattari's sense of an art that 
is uncontainable within any rationalized order of things. Benjamin 
writes: "Around the middle of the century, the conditions of artis 
tic production underwent a change. This change consisted in the 
fact that for the first time the form of the commodity imposed 
itself decisively on the work of art, and the form of the masses on 
its public. Particularly vulnerable to these developments, as can be 
seen now unmistakably in our century, was the lyric. It is the 
unique distinction of Les Fleurs du mal that Baudelaire responded to 
precisely these altered conditions with a book of poems. It is the 
best example of heroic conduct to be found in his life" 
(GS.V.1.424/AP336-377). Baudelaire's achievement was not to have 
left us a novel. However, Benjamin's Baudelaire is not merely the 
romantic artist in solitary metaphysical rebellion against a fallen 
world. He is rather the representative of the ecstatic social struc 
ture that makes him possible, namely the Boh?me (gs. 1.2.513 
14/CB11-34). The Boh?me is the underground (by no means the first 
of its kind when we think of Grubstreet, Bartholomew Fair, and 
the Elizabethan crowd that begins writing?about the London 
streets?for the printing press; think of how Marlowe ends his 
days). Benjamin defines the Boh?me as the hiding-place of politi 
cal conspirators during the Second Empire ("Professional conspir 
ator and dandy meet in the concept of the modern hero. This hero 
represents for himself in his own person, a whole secret society" 
[GS.V.1.478/AP378]). It is the world of lowlifes, wastrels, crimi 
nals, prostitutes, and Balzacian destitutes?Bataille's sacred 
realm of the "accursed." It is where the gambler is deposited at the 
end of his run. Its defining genre is the detective story. It is also 
the condition of the modern poet's existence. On Benjamin's 
analysis the Boh?me is a principle of modernist poetics (this is his 
Baudelaire-thesis). In antiquity it was the ecstasy of the poet that, 
according to the magnetic theory, constituted the condition of the 
anarchic community; in Benjamin it is the anarchic community 
that is the condition of poetry. In order to become a poet it is no 
longer enough to possess (as if by nature) a certain kind of sub 
jectivity (a dissatisfied memory is all one needs); it is now neces 
sary to belong to a certain kind of world in order to take on the 
kinds of subjectivity that that world makes available?the man of 
the barricades, the painted woman, the beggar, the painter of mod- 11 
ern life. ("In the guise of the beggar Baudelaire continually put the 
model of bourgeois society to the test" [GS.V.1.427/AP338].) At the 
end of the day Benjamin's Baudelaire is a kind of urbanized 
romantic ironist, a transcendental buffoon, a performance artist: 
Baudelaire did not have the humanitarian idealism of a 
Victor Hugo or a Lamartine. The emotional buoyancy of a 
Musset was not at his disposal. He did not, like Gautier, 
take pleasure in his times, nor could he deceive himself 
about them like Leconte de Lisle. It was not given him to 
find a refuge in devotions, like Verlaine, nor to heighten 
the youthful vigor of his lyric ?lan through the betrayal of 
his adulthood, like Rimbaud. As rich as Baudelaire is in 
the knowledge of his craft, he is relatively unprovided 
with stratagems to face the times. And even the grand 
tragic part he had composed for the arena of his day?the 
role of the "modern"?could be filled in the end only by 
himself. All this Baudelaire no doubt recognized. The 
eccentricities in which he took such pleasure were those 
of the mime who has to perform before a public incapable 
of following the action on the stage?a mime, further 
more, who knows this about his audience and, in his per 
formance, allows that knowledge its rightful due 
(g s. V.1.429/AP340). 
black mountain college. Voice, Jean-Luc Nancy says in "Vox 
Clamans in Deserto," is not an expression of the self but a projec 
tion of it. "Voice is not present to itself, it is only an exterior 
manifestation, a trembling that offers itself to the outside, the half 
beat of an opening?once again, a wilderness exposed where 
layers of air vibrate in the heat. The wilderness of the voice in the 
wilderness, in all its clamor?has no subject, no infinite unity; it 
always leaves for the outside, without self-presence, without self 
consciousness" (BP243). In Charles Olson's poetics the poetic sub 
ject does not reflect on itself but rather is projected like a breath 
(hence it is an "objectivist" rather than expressive or "subjectivist" 
poetics).30 The poem is not the reworking or working-out of genres 
and conventions (what Olson called "closed form); it is rather an 
12 event on the model of free expenditure (or "open form"): "The 
poem is energy transferred from where the poet got it (he will have 
some several causations), by way of the poem itself to, all the* way 
over to, the reader.... Then the poem must be, at all points, a high 
energy-construct and, at all points, a high energy-discharge" 
(PV52).31 Crucially, this is an expenditure of energy that is shaped 
by the poet's breath?the poetic line comes not from a manual of 
prosody but "(I swear it) from the breath of the poet, from the 
breathing of the man who writes" (PV54), which Olson identifies as 
"voice in its largest sense" (PV58). (Compare Adorno on breath as 
a musical unit in Sch?nberg.)32 In composition, Olson says, the 
typewriter allows the poet to score the voice of the poem, so that 
poetry, whatever else it might be, becomes the communication of 
voice: "It is the advantage of the typewriter that, due to its rigidity 
and its space precisions, it can, for a poet, indicate exactly the 
breath, the pauses, the suspensions even of the syllables, the jux 
tapositions even of part of phrases, which he intends. For the first 
time the poet has the stave and the bar a musician has had. For the 
first time he can, without the convention of rime and meter, record 
the listening he has done to his own speech and by that one act 
indicate how he would want any reader, silently or otherwise, to 
voice his work" (PV57-58). So the poem is not just composition but 
performance, and understanding the poem will mean performing it 
rather than subjecting it to exegesis. Sherman Paul compares the 
composition of projectivist verse to, among other things, action 
painting and jazz: "Projective verse is not only a poetics of presen 
tation but a poetics of present experience, of enactment. It replaces 
spectatorship with participation, and brings the whole self?the 
single intelligence: body, mind, soul?to the activity of creation. 
Dance, which Olson appreciated because it recalls us to our bodies 
and 'we use ourselves,' is a correlative of this poetics; and so are 
action painting and jazz, which poets at this time turned to because 
they offered the instruction they wanted. There was no poetic,' 
Olson said of this time. Tt was Charlie Parker.'"33 After Nancy one 
can think of the poem as a voice that passes from poet to reader. 
Poet and reader are linked as a sharing or partage rather than as 
author and exegete, artist and critic, or producer and consumer. It 
is possible to think of it as a movement of poetry from poet to poet, 
where poetry opens up a mode of existence in which poems appear. 
Stephen Fredman's idea is that projectivism is a social poetics as 13 
well as a poetics of verse. It is a poetics aimed not only at the pro 
duction of works but at the formation of the group?or, more 
exactly, the formation of a space (an open field) in which poets and 
artists can come and go and in which works of art are free to take 
place under any description. The formation of such a space is what 
Olson achieved (or sustained) at Black Mountain College during 
the early 1950s.34 Black Mountain College was an art school found 
ed in 1933. One of its first artists-in-residence was Josef Albers, who 
brought to the school an aesthetic outlook that he had acquired at 
the Bauhaus during the Weimar years: "art is concerned with the 
how and not with the what; not with literal content but with the 
performance of factual content. The performance?how it is 
done?that is the content of art."35 Olson was the school's director 
during its last five years of operation. In Black Mountain: An 
Exploration in Community, Martin Duberman's gives a detailed 
account of Olson's transformation of the college from an art school 
into an art colony?indeed, a colony of performance art.36 In 1952, 
to take a famous example, John Cage (who had been visiting the 
college since the early forties) staged one of his "circuses" in which 
ten people (poets, dancers, musicians, painters) were each 
assigned a time-slot of forty-five minutes (each running concur 
rently with the others) in which to do whatever they wished: 
Spectators took their seats in the square arena forming four 
triangles created by diagonal aisles, each holding the white 
cup that had been placed on their chair. White paintings by 
a visiting student, Robert Rauschenberg, hung overhead. 
From a stepladder Cage, in a black suit and tie, read a text 
"on the relation of music to Zen Bhuddism" and excerpts 
from Meister Eckhart. Then he performed a "composition 
with a radio," following the pre-arranged "time brackets." 
At the same time Rauschenberg played an old record on a 
hand-wound gramophone and David Tudor played a "pre 
pared piano." Later Tudor turned to two buckets, pouring 
water from one to the other while, planted in the audience, 
Charles Olson and Mary Caroline Richards read poetry. 
Cunningham and others danced through the aisles chased 
by an excited dog, Rauschenberg flashed "abstract slides" 
14 (created by coloured gelatine sandwiched between the 
glass) and film clips projected onto the ceiling showed first 
the school cook, and then, as they gradually moved from 
the ceiling down the wall, the setting sun. In a corner, the 
composer Jay Watt played exotic musical instruments and 
"whistles blew, babies screamed, and coffee was served by 
four boys dressed in white."37 
It was at Black Mountain that Merce Cunningham assembled 
his first dance company?with a Dionysian Charles Olson, all 
six-foot-seven, two hundred fifty pounds of him, taking class. 
(Cunningham says: "it wasn't unhappy to watch him?he was 
something like a light walrus.")38 One can imagine what Bataille 
would have made of Olson's companionship. Fielding Dawson 
recalls: 
"Charley was an enthusiastic teacher, and in those days 
optimistic, completely absorbed in his talk: the white blackboard 
began to fill with blue diagrams, blue words and long blue sen 
tences, his hands turned blue and he had blue smudges on his face 
and mustache from smoking his cigar with his chalk hand, on he 
went, and once, with no place to write, he wrote towards the edge 
of the blackboard, wrote down the right margin, there was no right 
margin, but he went on, crossing over and going through already 
sentences until he came to the chalk tray, and bending over went 
clean off the blackboard to the floor, laughing with us."39 (Recall 
Blanchot on the interminability of l'?criture.) 
d?s uvrement: worklessness. What conception of art, if 
any, attaches itself to the theory of "nonproductive expenditure"? 
Perhaps only the Duchampean concept of art-in-general: art freed 
from genre distinctions (painting, sculpture, music, verse).40 
Blanchot thinks that fragmentary writing is not a genre of writing 
but is just the thing itself, l'?criture, where all discursive fields are 
vulnerable to the d?s uvrement of l'?criture?in The Philosophical 
Discourse of Modernity Habermas defines postmodernity as, among 
other things, the seeping of poetry (opaque, self-reflexive lan 
guage) into philosophy (of a certain stripe) and then into the prob 
lem-solving communicative praxis that defines the public sphere.41 
Anarchy follows. The question of nonproductive expenditure has 
particular relevance to the problem of the avant-garde work. The 
avant-garde work does not belong to the history of genius, much 15 
less the history of taste, but to the history of the anarchist group. 
The avant-garde work is less likely to resemble a monumental con 
struction like Joyce's Ulysses than a minimalist event like John 
Cage's 433". Whereas the monumental work is classically self 
sufficient (Heidegger's ideal of the origiriary selfstanding Greek 
edifice, which appears to have created itself), the avant-garde work 
is accessible only through layers of social mediation, meaning that 
one has to belong to the social space in which the work appears in 
order to make sense of it at all (but Gadamer would say that this 
belonging is a condition of every aesthetic experience, ancient or 
modern). Moreover, belonging to such a space entails belonging to 
its history and therefore understanding the conditions that make 
the work a possibility in the moment at hand (that not everything 
is possible at every moment is the motto of art history: the experi 
ence of the work demands responsiveness to historicity?Blanchot 
would call this the exigency of the avant garde). In this respect 
understanding a work is more like understanding a social practice 
or a form of life than it is understanding a concept, proposition, or 
the use of criteria. This helps to explain why the avant-garde work 
is often not really accessible to critical spectators of a certain tra 
ditional disposition. A clear and fruitful example of this is Michael 
Fried's famous reaction to the Minimalist (or, as Fried prefers, "lit 
eralist") work of Donald Judd and Frank Stella during the sixties. 
Judd's sculptures appear to be simple indeterminate shapes with 
out parts or design or any sign of assembly or composition; Stella's 
paintings are painted stripes (famously, four identical paintings of 
black stripes exhibited in 1959-60). Fried meanwhile is a formalist 
whose relation to works of art is essentially judicial. Thus the issue 
for Fried is how, analytically, to tell a work of art from the materi 
al of which it is made (frame, canvas, painted shapes). "What is at 
stake," he says, "is whether the paintings or objects in question are 
experienced as paintings or as objects."42 Fried's position is that the 
materiality of the work must be experienced as a medium and not 
simply as material; otherwise we haven't got art but simply a mere 
thing. The position is similar to Adorno's formalism, which insists 
on matter as mediation, not in order to represent or intend some 
thing but simply to set the work apart from the empirical world 
("The concept of form marks out art's sharp antithesis to an empir 
16 ical world in which art's right to exist is uncertain").43 To be an art 
work the work must exhibit "aesthetic rationality" or the exercise 
of conscious control over its materials (AT58/AET34-35). Exeunt 
Duchamp, Cage, and the Minimalists. (Adorno again: "As soon as 
the artwork fears for its purity so fanatically that it loses faith in its 
possibility and begins to display outwardly what cannot become 
art?canvas and mere tones?it becomes its own enemy.... This 
tendency culminates in the happening" [AT158/AET103].) In Fried's 
language, by foregrounding medium the modernist work tries "to 
defeat or suspend its own objecthood" (A0120). No one sees a 
Jackson Pollock drip-painting as reducible to its material, although 
as action painting the work is perhaps inseparable from the per 
formance of its composition. But with Stella the difference 
between a painting and a painted canvas is no longer self-evident. 
One cannot tell that the thing is art simply by looking at it (in 
Clement Greenberg's famous expression, one is perilously close to 
looking simply at a frame and canvas exhibiting a flat surface).44 
For Fried this means that the Minimalist or literalist work is art 
that can no longer be experienced as art. Minimalism or literalism 
"aspires, not to defeat or suspend its own objecthood, but on the 
contrary to discover and project objecthood as such" (A0120). In 
which case it is something other than art: an object, although per 
haps not a real one. (!) It is interesting that Fried stops short of 
calling the Minimalist work a mere thinglike thing, although he no 
longer takes it as art. What is it, then? Or, as John Cage asked 
prophetically in a 1957 essay, "Where do we go from here?" (His 
answer was: "Towards theater.")45 
theater of cruelty. The interest of Fried's analysis is that he 
interprets the Minimalist work as an event or performance: "the 
literalist espousal of objecthood amounts to nothing other than a 
plea for a new genre of theater" (A0125).46 Fried means this as an 
insult but like Plato's rejection of the poets it is the medium of an 
essential insight: "theater," he says, "is now the negation of art" 
(which is, subtly, not the same as non-art) (A0125). The mode of 
appearance of the Minimalist work?its presence?"is basically a 
theatrical effect or quality?a kind of stage presence. It is a func 
tion, not just of the obtrusiveness and, often, even aggressiveness 
of the literalist work, but of the special complicity that that work 
extorts from the beholder" (A0127).47 Complicity is the essential 17 
note, that is, it defines something essential about the social nature 
of the avant-garde work, whose "objecthood" is not that of a work 
that one simply beholds; rather the work is folded into an event in 
which one is a participant and not simply a beholder, at least not 
a critical observer whose job is zoning and assessment. The 
Minimalist work occupies something close to what Deleuze and 
Guattari call 
"haptic" or non-optical space, a space that can only 
be entered, not comprehended as a whole or from a perspective.48 
It is an event, moreover, in which one's participation makes the 
work possible (as in Gadamer's theory). Possibly the work may 
not outlast its event, as in performance art. Theater has this tran 
sitory ontology which Artaud's "theater of cruelty" tries to isolate 
by separating the theater-event from any notion of work or text: in 
"pure theater," otherwise called the "anarchic poetry of space," 
there are no antecedents to performance?in other words, no 
dramatization; the language of theater becomes a medium of noise 
and physical shock; the after-effect of theater is not catharsis but 
trauma.49 Performance art is a strong example of nonproductive 
expenditure because its purse is entirely exhausted by what takes 
place. Dance likewise is a good case of d?s uvrement. A piece of 
choreography is a kind of body art that is extremely difficult to pre 
serve over time: dancers grow old, the dance mistress forgets, or 
dies. Balanchine could never understand why people wanted him 
to revive his earlier achievements. There is no text for the chore 
ography of Swan Lake the way there is a score for its music or a 
narrative for its story (dance notation is a good example of 
"indeterminacy of translation"). A performance can be repeated 
but not preserved. (A video recording of a performance is not a 
performance of anything but the video recording.) In an essay on 
"The Impermanent Art" (1955) Merce Cunningham said that his 
idea of dance is to perform something that is just the thing itself: 
for example, a jump (without musical accompaniment, but when 
Cunningham collaborated with his friend John Cage, not without 
noise). Cunningham's choreography, following Cage, sometimes 
takes the form of tossing a coin to determine what shape the jump 
will take, and what is shaped is not only a bodily movement but 
the time and space in which the movement occurs, a shape that 
exists only for an instant and will never occur again. On other 
18 occasions Cunningham's dancers improvise their movements. 
This is not artlessness: since the dancers are superbly trained, 
their movements cannot help being dance (as if a dancer could no 
longer merely move). But their movement is exhausted in the per 
formance of it; it is what Deleuze and Guattari call a haecceity, a 
singularity like five o'clock yesterday evening.50 There will be other 
five o'clocks but not that one. Fried says: "The success, even the 
survival, of the arts has come increasingly to depend on their abil 
ity to defeat theater" (A0139); "Art degenerates as it approaches 
the condition of theater" (A0141). So once more the history of art 
comes to an end.51 In the 1970s performance art followed 
Minimalism by doing away with the production of objects alto 
gether.52 The idea was in part to see whether one could create an 
art that could not be bought or sold. This was already the goal of 
Dada and the (or some) Surrealists. One can think of the New 
York of the 1970s as a recuperation of Dada the way the New York 
of the fifties and sixties was a recuperation of Duchamp. True to 
the spirit of the age but also to the spirit of Artaud, Bataille, and 
perhaps before them all, Alfred Jarry, certain performance artists 
probed for an absolute stopping-point, as when Chris Burden had 
himself shot in the arm with a pistol or when Orlan had her face 
surgically removed, with the surgery being simultaneously telecast 
to several places around the world.53 Here is an end-of-art story to 
end all end-of-art stories, as if art were crossing over into Bataille's 
underworld of mutilation, sacrifice, and suicide. In its obsession 
with extreme situations, performance art belongs to the history of 
Surrealism, or at all events to Artaud's kind of theater as "an area 
in which there are no precise rules," except for one: "Without an 
element of cruelty at the foundation of every spectacle, the theater 
is not possible" (0C118/AA251). Imagine cruelty as a condition of 
theater (this was already the insight of the Jacobean stage?think 
of Jonson's Bartholomew Fair in which someone pours hot grease on 
the foot of Ursula the Pig Woman). Bataille, who knew Artaud 
slightly, once went to hear him speak: 
A few years before I had attended a lecture he gave at the 
Sorbonne.... He talked about theatrical art, and in the 
state of half-somnolence in which I listened I became 
aware that he had suddenly risen: I understood what he 
was saying, he had resolved to personify the state of mind 
of Thyestes when he realized that he had devoured his 19 
own children. Before an auditorium packed with the bour 
geoisie (there were hardly any students), he grasped his 
stomach and let out the most inhuman sound that has 
ever come from a man's throat: it created the sort of dis 
quiet that would have been felt if a dear friend had sud 
denly become delirious. It was awful (perhaps the more so 
for being only acted out) (AM43). 
la communaut? d?s uvr?e. The avant-garde work empha 
sizes the theatricality that is arguably a condition of all art. One 
could put this in a slightly different way. In the avant-garde the 
production of the work cannot be separated from the formation of 
the group, and vice versa: in the case of the Surrealists, for exam 
ple, the group is the work?"Surrealism," Blanchot says, "is and 
has always been a collective experience" (E198/1C08)?but a work 
in the sense of Nancy's communaut? d?s uvr?e rather than on the 
order of Socrates' 
"city of words" or in Aristotle's conception of 
politics as an extension of the logical form of friendship (which is 
also the form of the proposition: friendship follows the logic of 
identity rather than the relation of alterity).54 Benjamin in his essay 
on the Surrealists emphasizes the primacy of ecstatic experiences 
over the production of works: "anyone who has perceived that the 
writings of this circle are not literature but something else? 
demonstrations, watchwords, documents, bluffs, forgeries if you 
will, but at any rate not literature?will also know, for the same 
reason, that the writings are concerned literally with experiences, 
not with theories and still less with phantasms."55 The group 
always has the structure (and often the historical location) of a 
Boh?me: a non-productive community that does not hang together, 
which does not last, and whose floating center is the performance 
(the exhibition, the reading, the happening, and more generally 
the scene). Its population is Baudelairean in the sense of nomadic; 
it exists like a Deleuzean "war machine."56 Its distinctive modes of 
communication are gossip, collaboration, the quarrel, and the 
inevitably short-lived review. In his memoir, The Black Mountain 
Review, Robert Creeley recalls Ezra Pound's advice: think of a lit 
erary review as something around which you gather people, not a 
box to put them in.57 Its solidarity is the solidarity of theater, where 
20 theater should to be understood in Artaud's sense in which the 
distance between performers and spectators narrows to zero? 
Artaud pictures his audience as a crowd in the street, a porous, 
exposed, Nietzschean audience whose ancestor is the Dionysian 
community: "We are eliminating the stage and the auditorium and 
replacing them with a kind of single site, without partition or bar 
rier of any kind, which will itself become the theater of the action. 
A direct communication will be reestablished between the specta 
tor and the spectacle, between the actor and the spectator, because 
the spectator, by being placed in the middle of the action, is 
enveloped by it and caught in its crossfire" (0014-15/AA248). The 
"Futurist moment," as Marjorie Perloff has shown, is a moment of 
theatricality whose principal form is the manifesto, "a new literary 
genre" designed to work like a political intervention rather than as 
a work of art.58 The idea is to alter the art world and not simply to 
find one's place in it or merely take it over as is. Futurism 
(whether Italian or Russian) defines the original difference 
between avant-garde aesthetics in general and the formalist aes 
thetics of high modernism (as in Greenberg's and Fried's "mod 
ernism"): the artist's task is to create a new environment and not 
just new objects. Indeed the one is the condition of the other, 
because the avant-garde environment (the Cabaret Voltaire is the 
locus classicus) works like an anarchic space in which any innova 
tion?indeed, anything at all?can take place. ("Do Whatever" is 
the rule of Duchampean modernism, according to Thierry de Duve 
[KD327].) In My Futurist Years Roman Jakobson gives a moving and 
often funny account of the way he was swept up into just such a 
space created by Majakovskij and Xlebnikov, whose collection of 
poems and manifestoes, A Slap in the Face of Public Taste (1912), was 
one of the texts that inspired Jakobson to become a linguist spe 
cializing in the study of poetic language. Of course Jakobson tried 
his hand at poetry and at writing manifestoes, and he collaborated 
with Majakovskij and Xlebnikov on many projects, but the moral 
of his story is that one doesn't have to be an artist to belong to an 
art world; the idea is to experience it?and the experience is of 
social transformation (inhabiting a new world): "The evenings of 
the Futurists brought together an amazing number of the public: 
the Large Hall of the Polytechnic Museum was completely packed! 
The public's reaction to them was various: many came for the sake 
of scandal, but a broad segment of the student public awaited the 21 
new art, wanted the new word (by the way?and this is interest 
ing?they weren't particularly interested in prose. This was a time 
when readers... thought that the main thing was poetry, and that 
poetry had a genuinely new word to say. Apart from these large 
public evenings there were many closed groups, circles, and private 
gatherings, where the main place was allotted to the new word)."59 
In his study of the poetic communities of North Beach in San 
Francisco, the poet Michael Davidson gives perhaps the best 
account we have of how deeply poets like Allen Ginsberg and Jack 
Spicer invested themselves in the formation of such communities, 
and how poetic subjectivities (like Davidson's own) took shape 
within such formations.60 Imagine an aesthetics whose goal is not 
so much the creation of the work as the creation of a form of life 
that produces poets. ("An author who teaches writers nothing, 
teaches no one," says Walter Benjamin.)61 As Michael Davidson 
suggests, this would be something like a Utopian aesthetics or a 
political imaginary in which, among other things, poetry and art 
would no longer be required to justify themselves (before whom?) 
in order to exist. No apologies, no regrets. Imagine poetry as a 
given?freed from the Socratic exigency that lovers of poetry must 
come to its defense. Poetry presupposes a culture of the gift in 
which responsiveness and acceptance?as well as, to be sure, 
exposure and risk?are what make reality inhabitable. It presup 
poses what Nancy calls community: being together or being-in 
common in which "we are not a 
'being' but a 'happening.'" ("Finite 
History" [BP157]). The poet David Antin captures something of 
this in one of his talk-poems, "what it means to be avant-garde": 
and i 
did the best i could under the circumstances of being 
there then which is my image of what an artist does and 
is somebody who does the best he can under the 
circumstances without worrying about making it new or 
shocking because the best you can do depends upon what you 
have to do and where and if you have to invent something 
new to do the work at hand you will but not if you have a 
ready-made that will work and is close at hand and you want 
to get on with the rest of the business 
22 then youll pick up 
the tool thats there a tool that somebody else has made 
that will work and youll lean on it and feel grateful 
when its good to you for somebody elses work and youll 
think of him as a friend who would borrow as freely from you 
if he thought of it or needed to because there is 
a 
community of artists who don't recognize copyrights and 
patents or shouldn't except under unusual circumstances 
who send each other tools in the mail or exchange them 
, 62 
in conversation in a bar 
language writing. Much of the most memorable poetry 
written in North America during the past half-century has 
sometimes gone by the name of "Language Poetry," 
or l=a=n = g = u=a=g = e Poetry, after the journal 
L=A=N=G=U=A=G=E, edited by Charles Bernstein and Bruce 
Andrews between 1978 and 1981. Language Poetry looks very much 
like the longest-running literary movement of the twentieth cen 
tury. Its poets are flourishing thirty years after the fact. This may 
be in part because Language Poetry is not an aesthetic concept; 
strictly speaking it is not a concept at all but a family name. No 
description of formal features or tendencies could define the term; 
it is not a kind of ism but simply a number of large, diverse, and 
fluid interactions among poets centered in San Francisco and New 
York but also embracing Canada and Great Britain, with filiations 
extending into Eastern Europe and Australia (and translations 
into, among other languages, Chinese.) Like the Surrealists the 
Language Poets share practices rather than views. What makes 
them a group is their involvement with one another in a variety of 
activities from poetry readings to literary criticism to publication 
in a surprising number of journals, anthologies, web sites, and 
thoroughly non-commercial books of poetry published by an array 
of small presses (Figures, roof, Sun & Moon). Individually they 
do very different things, but they do so within the framework of 
social interaction highlighted above all by the poetry reading. 
Charles Bernstein writes: 
Readings are the central social activity of poetry. They 
rival publishing as the most significant method of distri 
bution of poetic works. They are as important as books 23 
and magazines in bringing poets into contact with one 
another, in forming generational and cross-generational, 
cultural and cross-cultural, links, affinities, alliances, 
scenes, networks, exchanges, and the like.... The reading 
is the site in which the audience of poetry constitutes and 
reconstitutes itself. It makes itself visible to itself.... I 
would turn around the familiar criticism that everyone at 
a poetry reading is a poet to say that this is just what is 
vital about a reading series, even the essence of a poetry 
reading. For poetry is constituted dialogically through 
recognition and exchange with an audience of peers, 
where the poet is not performing to invisible readers or 
listeners but actively exchanging work with other per 
formers and participants.... The poetry reading is an 
ongoing convention of poetry, by poetry, for poetry.63 
Bob Perelman writes: "The performances, pieces, and talks on poet 
ics that took place frequently during the initial stages of the for 
mation of the language group were communal events, casual, 
intense interactions that took place in lofts and art spaces. But they 
were not only addressed to immediate participants: they were also 
recorded. However contingent and trivial some of the remarks 
were, those tapes were aimed at entering and redefining literary 
history."64 One could also say they were aimed at appropriating liter 
ary history, specifically the history of poetry, as if to keep it from 
coming to an end. The crucial point seems to be that among 
Language Poets it is a given that the extension of the concept of 
poetry cannot be closed by a frontier. Language poets are widely 
dedicated to conceptual investigations in poetics and poetic theory 
and to formal experimentation as a way of keeping the limits of 
what counts as poetry unsettled or controversial. Sound poetry and 
concrete poetry are perhaps not so much limits as horizons that 
face each other across a vast poetic circus. In any event the spirit of 
Language Poetry is essentially that of the anarchist group: the idea 
is to create and maintain a space in which (granting historical con 
ditions) anything is possible. What informs Language Poetry is in 
any case historical rather than theoretical. These poets are deeply 
self-consciousness of what one might call their situation at "the 
24 end of history." They understand themselves as belonging to (and 
essentially responsible for) a specific tradition made up of William 
Carlos Williams, Ezra Pound, Charles Reznikoff, Louis Zukofsky, 
Jackson MacLow, the Black Mountain Poets, Allan Ginsburg and 
the Beats, as well as the avant-garde groups that San Francisco and 
New York continue to make possible. Historical self-awareness is a 
distinctive feature of the Language Poets?whence their idea, 
derived from Mallarm? but given a particular turn by William 
Carlos Williams, that poetry is an exploration of language in all of 
its formal, material, and semantic dimensions, and in particular in 
its historical conditions of existence within an array of social and 
economic contexts. A great many of these poets hold the view that 
poetry is not simply another species of discourse, a particular way 
of using language that can be contrasted with other discursive gen 
res (philosophy, science, law, everyday speech), but is simply a con 
dition of language as such, so that what counts as a poem will depend 
as much upon how we listen to language in the world around us as 
upon our capacities as speakers or writers. There is as much poet 
ry as music in the noise of the world. It is interesting to know that 
the motto of 
"language as such" originated among the Russian 
Futurists that so intoxicated Roman Jakobson.65 But for the 
Language Poets language is invisible to linguistics. It is accessible 
only at the level of experience and participation (street level, or at 
the level of theater) and not at the level of formal description. 
the h?t?roclite entity. Hence the concentration among 
Language Poets upon the idea of poetry as a mode of performance, 
where the emphasis falls, among other places, on how a poem (or 
how language) makes its appearance.66 We can think of this 
emphasis as a modification of the modernist thesis that a poem is 
made of words but is not a use of them. This is not just an inten 
sification of the thesis but (as in Blanchot's poetics of d?s uvre 
ment) a bending of it away from the idea of a poem as something 
made (an artifact). The point to understand is that performance is 
not something added to something made; it is what is made?the 
thing itself. This is because the temporality of the poem is not of 
something present but of something that interrupts the present by 
taking shape there. In one of his talk-poem, "durations," David 
Antin calls attention to the two modes of existence of his "work": 
25 
as a performer im an improviser so i dont know 
exactly what im going to say when i begin though ive 
thought about talking of particular things and when ive 
finished talking i may still be interested in something ive 
said and i may want to think about it again and sometimes 
i'll want to look at it and transcribe it and maybe even 
publish it in a more or less extensive form that hangs 
pretty close to the original talk or the sense of it 
even when ive extended it because im much less 
interested in revision and polishing than in the difference 
between print and performance (wim65) 
The difference between performance and print is, for Antin, analo 
gous to the difference between poetry and works (that is, objects) 
of art: "most people / in art schools are interested in making 
objects," that is, "objects of duration." Such objects don't interest 
Antin. To say why they don't he recalls a visit of his to the Louvre 
in which he hunts up mainly the paintings of low-profile artists 
while trying very hard (but failing) to avoid the Mona Lisa tour. On 
his way out he passes one of Rembrandt's self-portraits: 
as i passed the rembrandts on the way out i 
stopped for a moment to look once again at the self portrait 
with the pallette in his hand and the turban tied around his 
head which looks more like a painters cloth to protect his 
hair and an expression that suggests some kind of comment 
on the object of painting its meaning and perhaps its duration 
a comment that looks to me like the beginning of a very 
rueful Jewish grin that expresses something of my own 
disdain for the idea of duration (wim72) 
What are 
"objects of duration"? They are evidently not just things 
that don't get thrown away?unlike Duchamp's Readymades, 
which we know of chiefly from photographs or replicas; they are 
cultural icons like the Mona Lisa, and also of course like 
Rembrandt's self-portraits; but the Rembrandt that catches 
Antin's attention is a self-interrupting icon (like the one in John 
Ashbery's Self Portrait in a Convex Mirror). As a self-portrait it incor 
26 porates?one could say: perpetually interrupts?the performance 
of its composition. The expression on Rembrandt's face is a 
moment of d?s uvrement?unworking?inserted into the work. 
An entretemps. Naturally one thinks about whether the same is true 
of the Mona Lisa's smile. We underestimate the difficulty of such 
smiles with respect to aesthetic experience as a disinterested 
event. At any rate Antin reads Rembrandt's face as a "rueful Jew 
ish grin that expresses something of my own / disdain for the idea 
of duration." I want to say that this disdain of duration expresses 
the fundamental anarchism (one could call the anti-principle prin 
ciple: the d?s uvrement) of Antin's poetics (and of the avant garde, 
of performance art, and of Language Poetry). The idea is to pro 
duce an event in which the work takes place without taking final 
form; it materializes without becoming objectified or even 
finished. The poem in this respect is a singularity, a haecceity that 
can be communicated through a partage of voices but which can no 
longer be identified on its own as a thing set apart from the com 
munity that assembles in its company. John Cage remarked on the 
ability of Robert Rauschenberg's paintings to escape the fixity of 
painting despite being made of paint, not to mention canvases 
stretched on a frame and hung on a wall, for all the world objects 
of art: "Over and over again I've found it impossible to memorize 
Rauschenberg's paintings. I keep asking, 'Have you changed it?' 
And then noticing while I'm looking that it changes. I look out the 
window and see the icicles. There dripping water is frozen into an 
object. The icicles all go down. Winter more than the others is the 
season of quiescence."67 What's the principle here? 
io" The principle called mobility-immobility is this: 
every thing is changing 
but while some things 
are changing 
others are not. 
20" 
eventually those 
that were 
not 
30" 
changing 27 
begin suddenly 
to change (S154) 
The principle (mobility-immobility: d?s uvrement) is that the work 
of art belongs to an unstable environment (historicity is internal 
to its essence); it cannot be sealed off from this environment 
because it is, whatever else it is, an event that happens simultane 
ously with everything else taking place in the ongoing places it 
traverses and which, indeed, it works to form. (Recall Celan's 
figure of the poem: Unterwegssein ["Der Meridian," 
GW3:i86/cP34].) There are no unaccompanied works of art. Poets 
and audiences of poetry are clandestine companions of poems that 
travel from one environment to another. To be sure, we are trained 
in school to transform works of art into aesthetic phenomena by 
bracketing them?Gadamer calls this "aesthetic differentiation" 
(wm8i/ TM85). But the poem cannot be differentiated as a one 
time thing that gets picked up now and again by the isolated read 
er. On the contrary, as Peter Middleton suggests in an essay on 
"The Contemporary Poetry Reading," the concept of the poem 
needs to be radically socialized: "Instead of thinking of the poem 
as something that moves around being variously interpreted, read 
aloud, published in different forms, and generally provoking dis 
tinct interpretations, we might be better to think of it all as a large 
h?t?roclite entity, that mixes texts, people, performances, memo 
ries, and other possible affines, in a process that engages many 
people, perhaps only briefly, over a long period of time, whose out 
comes are usually hard to see, and which has no clear boundaries, 
not the page, the reading, the critical study."68 
community without myth. Thierry de Duve regards mod 
ernism as a Utopian project that failed (KD191). A hundred years of 
in-your-face rhetoric has (he thinks) left modernity?the alienat 
ed, rationalized world of industrial-technological capitalism? 
unchanged. (This is a universal disappointment at the end of the 
century: art, like politics, is unredemptive.) Says de Duve: the art 
world, especially in New York, is thoroughly commercialized?a 
market institution if there ever was one?and painters mostly 
work alone (KD191-92). As a self-professed "man of'68" (KD288) 
28 de Duve longs for community (KD462). But probably not a poetic 
community, since such a community does not fit anywhere along 
the axis between libertarian-communitarian or liberal-socialist 
categories. The poem as a "h?t?roclite entity" is anarchic on the 
model of partage: as a formal object the poem is always in excess 
of itself?ecstatic: journeying outside itself and absorbing its sur 
roundings into itself as it goes. Why not think of this as the his 
torical mode of existence of the poem, whose self-identity is not a 
logical ipseity but entails the multiple communities that it gener 
ates through those whom it fascinates? Nancy points out that lit 
erature is not myth?on a certain romantic, functionalist, nation 
alist notion of myth as a unitary narrative that gathers a whole 
people into a totality. Whereas myth (in this certainly erroneous 
sense) produces communion?heterogeneous people united as in 
one voice?literature is serial in its production, a sharing or divi 
sion of voices: its unity is not organic, that is, as Nancy puts it, it 
is "articulated" rather than 
"organized," where "articulation is 
only a juncture, or more exactly the play of a juncture: what takes 
place where different pieces touch each other without fusing 
together, where they slide, pivot, or tumble over one another, one 
at the limit of the other?exactly at its limit?where these singu 
lar and distinct pieces fold or stiffen, flex or tense themselves 
together and through one another, unto one another, without this 
mutual play?which always remains, at the same time, a play 
between them?ever forming into the substance of a higher power 
of a Whole" (CD188/1C76). So one could say that, unlike romantic 
myth (or ideology, law, or philosophical rationality), what poetry 
produces is not a totality or a unitary community but a series 
or tradition of communities whose sociality, if I have it right, is 
theatrical and performative rather than civil, economic, or even 
ideological. 
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